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When Is Truth Relevant? 
In the postmodern era, the relevance of the concept of truth, never a stress-free 
subject, has become a particularly vexed philosophical question.  Along with other classical 
notions such as reason, identity and objectivity, the concept of truth has come to be regarded 
in some quarters with considerable suspicion.  In part this suspicion is unescapable given the 
postmodern project’s commitment to the exposure of the extent to which what is held to be 
knowledge or truth is determined by powerful interests.  However, recognition that power 
and ideology do play an important role in determining what we call truth has often led to a 
thoroughgoing relativism and temptation to conclude that therefore ‘anything goes’.  As the 
cultural theorist Terry Eagleton has written, ‘Against these Enlightenment norms, 
[postmodernity] sees the world as contingent, ungrounded, diverse, unstable, indeterminate, a 
set of disunified cultures or interpretations which breed a degree of scepticism about the 
objectivity of truth, history and norms, the givenness of natures and the coherence of 
identities.’ (Eagleton, 1996).   
Opponents of this kind of stance show a tendency to fall back to an absolutist 
position, fearing that ‘Without defences against postmodern irony and cynicism, 
multiculturalism and relativism, we will all go to hell in a handbasket.’ (Blackburn, 2005, p. 
xiii).  The philosopher Simon Blackburn has suggested that this tendency to polarisation and 
conflict ‘grumbles within the breast of each individual’ as well as being manifest between 
people and groups, so it should not surprise us that the schism is rife also in psychoanalysis 
since it reflects a division within all of us.  In a passing allusion to Wittgenstein’s assertion 
that the proper job of philosophy is to provide a kind of therapy enabling us to correct 
fallacies of thought, Blackburn intriguingly frames this conflict as an immune deficiency: 
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[This] conflict is about our conception of ourselves and our world, about the meaning 
of our sayings, and indeed the meaning of our activities and of our lives.  It is about 
ideas that make up ‘the spirit of the age’, and that determine the atmosphere we 
breathe.  If the ideas are inadequate or dangerous, then we need an immune system to 
protect us from them, and the only immunity would have to be conferred by better 
ideas. (p. xiv)            
This paper will develop Blackburn’s hint that at the level of the individual, the 
tendency to think in terms of a forced choice between commitment to the idea that there is a 
truth that can be revealed if one works hard enough and sceptical relativism is indicative of 
an immune deficiency or lack of resilience in the face of external impingement.  We will 
explore the sociobiological relevance of the concept of truth as the primary qualifier of 
human communication which underpins the transmission of knowledge across generations, 
which in turn lies at the foundation of human evolution. Culture is the reservoir of knowledge 
accumulated and transmitted from one generation to the next and its preservation ensures 
individual adaptation and survival as well as the survival of social organizations; both are 
vulnerable to misleading and unreliable information. We will argue that thinking in terms of 
the forced choice Blackburn describes is an outcome of epistemic hypervigilance, a suspicion 
in relation to social influence that can prevent an individual from sufficiently trusting others 
to learn from them.  In a clinical context, such hypervigilance is a major barrier to therapeutic 
change.  In the context of a social movement (a collective of minds) such as psychoanalysis, 
the relativisation of truth can similarly serve as a protection from learning and the conferment 
of “better ideas”.   We will suggest that while the experience of knowing and having the truth 
about oneself known in the context of therapy is a necessary first step in bringing down this 
barrier, it should not be viewed as an end in itself but rather as the establishment of a stance 
that can drive learning about one’s world.   
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The relativisation of truth 
The philosophical debate on truth has been at the forefront of psychoanalytic 
discourse about therapeutic action for many years.  On one hand there are those who 
characterise the experience of psychoanalysis in terms of its enabling of access to some sort 
of truth.  Freud consistently formulated the purpose of psychoanalysis in terms of making the 
unconscious conscious (Freud, 1909)[Freud, 1933 #2530] and Grünbaum (1984) made it the 
acid test of psychoanalytic hypothetico-deductive hypotheses (Grünbaum, 2008). Many 
subsequent formulations have laid stress on the role played by analysis in replacing evasion 
of a frustrating reality with acceptance in order to be able to modify it (e.g. Bion, 1962a). 
David Bell [, 2009 #91] has suggested that ‘All of us suffer from various kinds of 
epistemological malaise when it comes to facing certain unwanted aspects of reality’ (p. 337); 
he characterises Freud along with Marx as critical thinkers seeking to expose the illusions we 
create and live by.  Edna O’Shaughnessy (O'Shaughnessy, 1994) has defended the existence 
of scientific clinical facts, defining them as truths about the immediate emotional reality 
between analyst and patient.   
However, thanks to the pluralism of modern psychoanalysis (Bernardi, 2005; 
Jimenez, 2008; Wallerstein, 1992) there is less clarity than there once was regarding the kinds 
of truths that psychoanalysis ought to be uncovering, and perhaps a further consequence of 
psychoanalytic pluralism is increasing scepticism about whether what is at stake is or should 
be the uncovering of truth at all.  For example, Owen Renik [, 1998 #93] has argued that ‘In 
order for us to develop a psychoanalytic theory that can direct us towards effective clinical 
practice […] it is crucial for us to relinquish any claim that an analyst in the treatment 
situation can be objective, in the positivist sense of the term, i.e. objective in a way that is 
significantly independent of subjective interests.’ (p. 492).  He goes on to state that ‘Ethan 
[his patient] and I, in our investigation, were not trying to discover something that was 
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already there. We were trying to devise a view of Ethan's life, present and past, that worked, 
i.e. that helped him feel better. We evaluated the validity of our understanding entirely on the 
basis of its therapeutic efficacy (p. 492). ’   The classical idea that the aim of analysis is or 
should be to discover truths about oneself has come to be associated with what Arnold 
Cooper [, 2003 #94]described as the ‘intellectual reign of terror’ of psychoanalytic orthodoxy 
in the US, the political aspect of which was exposed by the landmark lawsuit brought by a 
group of psychologists against the American Psychoanalytic Association and the IPA. The 
emotional strength of post-modern relativism and its intense intellectual pluralist sequelae are 
hard to comprehend without first-hand experience of the intermingling of intense mono-
disciplinary dominance and theoretical absolutism of the preceding period. 
In this context, relinquishing claims to objectivity on the part of the analyst can be 
read as the adoption of an ethical as well as an epistemological stance of openness.  However, 
David Tuckett has argued that the resultant bewildering level of pluralism in psychoanalysis 
both within and beyond the IPA has been incompatible with ‘many of the basic 
characteristics of modern professional regulation (Tuckett, 2003); including an environment 
of transparent scientific debate and professional quality control that makes it possible to 
attempt to compare and test the value of alternative theories and approaches in different 
clinical situations, and to state which ideas and practices are more or less beneficial and 
which are wrong’ (Tuckett, 2005, p. 32).  There has been resistance from various quarters to 
efforts to determine such standards, on the grounds that ‘much of the formulation and 
maintenance of psychoanalytic standards is inherently a political process’ (Renik, 2005, p. 
61)).  In effect, as we have demonstrated using bibliometric methods (Fonagy, 2003), citation 
statistics reveal an increasing fragmentation in our discipline; contributors appear willing to 
more or less ignore contemporary contributions other than from specific narrow orientations 
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siloed from one another cohering around a heroic period half a Century ago when object 
relations theory came to dominate psychoanalytic scholarship.  
As our concern here is not the psychoanalytic movement but rather the individual 
patient’s experience of truth, we should conclude this brief section on the relativisation of 
truth with a warning. Unwarranted certainty and its fundamental rejection may both be (in 
our language) non-mentalizing, or pre-mentalizing in character. We have described undue 
certainty about the veracity of an idea as psychic equivalence while a total repudiation of this 
certainty we denoted as pretend mode. Both are characteristic of a pre-mentalizing phase in 
the development of psychic reality (Fonagy & Target, 1996; Target & Fonagy, 1996). In our 
questionnaire measure of mentalizing we assess both excessive uncertainty and undue 
certainty as indicators of poor mentalizing (Fonagy et al., in press). In the current context it 
may be sufficient to say that if we see the global direction of therapeutic effort as the 
enhancement of mentalizing, both approaches to truth would be inimical to this purpose.   
Truth as mental process (not mental representation) 
A second, perhaps more fruitful development pertaining to the question of the 
relevance of truth in psychoanalysis has arisen from consideration of factors that prevent 
‘normal’ neurotic functions such as repression and more generally the constitution of psychic 
reality from arising and operating stably. Although many psychoanalytic writers have 
considered this polarity, it is probably accurate to credit Wilfred Bion with bringing selective 
absence of specific mental capacities to the foreground of psychoanalytic theorising (Bion, 
1959, 1962a, 1962b).  Where Bion went, many followed, some explicitly acknowledging the 
links to Bion, others appearing more reluctant.  For example, many years ago, scotomising 
our own indebtedness to Bion, we suggested that what we called disorders of mental 
representation could helpfully be distinguished from disorders of mental process (Fonagy, 
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Edgcumbe, Moran, Kennedy, & Target, 1993). Treatment of disorders of mental 
representation focuses on the mental mechanisms involved in the recovery of threatening 
ideas and feelings and the consequent reorganization of mental structures commonly invoked 
in explanations of psychoanalytic process.   
The concept of disorders of mental process arose out of the experience of the 
psychoanalytic treatment of seriously disturbed patients.  For example, a child who has been 
the victim of abuse may exclude from his mental activity all representations concerning the 
thoughts and feelings of his objects (Fonagy, 1998a). Forgoing thought about the mental state 
of others (what we came to refer to as mentalizing) may be the only means available to such a 
child to deal with the terror of contemplating his primary object's murderous wishes toward 
him.  In this context, defensive avoidance of the ‘truth’ of an idea must be distinguished from 
defensive avoidance of the process of creating ideas (i.e. thinking) altogether.  The aim of 
treatment in this latter case must be gradually to reactivate the inhibited mental process by 
elaborating the patient’s preconscious mental content and giving them opportunities to 
explore the analyst’s mental states in the context of the transference.  Rather than seeking to 
restore access to a previously repudiated set of representations through interpretation, as in 
treatment of disorders of mental representation, what the analyst offers is in the Anna 
Freudian tradition of developmental help – not gratification or education, but scaffolding of 
the development of a capacity that has been defensively inhibited.   
Truth, if relevant, rests in the reality of perceiving the object (self or other) as fully 
mentally functioning. The complement of truth, a lie, ie the deliberate manipulation of the 
belief states of an agent, paradoxically assumes a capacity to mentalize. To be able to detect 
falsehood therefore requires an even higher order capacity for representing the intention of 
the other as deceptive (understanding their intent to misrepresent in relation to one’s own 
mind state). Given this complexity (third order theory of mind) it is unsurprising that we do 
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not normally calculate such complex intentions but rather aim to achieve a general subjective 
state  of truth where an overarching experience of something being real and vital is created 
(see below). 
Historical truth 
Writing in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis in 1999, we clarified that 
while certain forms of psychopathology can be conceptualised as disorders of mental 
representation, the mental representations we deal with in psychoanalysis should not be 
simplistically equated with memories of past events.  We suggested that  
The only way we can know what goes on in our patient's mind, what might have 
happened to them, is how they are with us in the transference. They come to us with a 
kind of model—a network of unconscious expectations or mental models of self–
other relationships. Individual experiences that have contributed to this model may or 
may not be ‘stored’ elsewhere as discrete autobiographical memories, but in either 
case the model is now ‘autonomous’, no longer dependent on the experiences that 
have contributed to it.  (Fonagy, 1999, p. 217). 
We proposed that the key to therapeutic action lies in the conscious elaboration of 
preconscious relationship representations, principally through the analyst's attention to the 
transference, and that as a result change occurs in implicit memory leading to a change of the 
procedures the person uses in living with himself and with others.  We argued that the 
recovery of memories in therapy is an epiphenomenon, a consequence rather than a cause of 
change.   
This is not to say that truth is somehow ‘embedded in the transference’. We stressed 
at the time that we were not claiming that attention to the transference opened a royal road to 
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understanding what had ‘really’ happened to the patient, noting (along the lines of Heinz 
Hartmann’s [, 1955 #933] stress on the genetic fallacy) that the models patients come with 
‘are not replicas of actual experience but are undoubtedly defensively distorted by wishes and 
fantasies current at the time of the experience (p. xx)’  However, Harold Blum’s [, 2003 
#6543] critique of the editorial read it as having presented transference as ‘a literal 
recapitulation of the patient's early object relations’ (p. 499). Blum argued that true 
knowledge of a patient’s life history is a necessary corrective to the underlying conflicts and 
defensive compromise aspects of transference.  Here we can see another version of the 
anxiety that without due attention to historical truth we might end up in a situation where 
‘anything goes’ so that patient and analyst are caught up in a folie àdeux, no longer able to 
ground themselves through a connection with reality.   
The emotional moment of truth 
Whereas Blum took us to task for failure to attend to historical truth, another line of 
criticism which our mentalization-based theory of psychopathology and treatment faced was 
our perceived failure to attend to psychic truth.   Our interest in severe disturbance and the 
impact of trauma, especially attachment trauma, and the resulting focus on forms of 
psychopathology that we conceptualised as disorders of mental process, has led to our theory 
being widely interpreted (not without some justification) as a deficit-focused model [e.g. 
\Kernberg, 2008 #98], essentially explaining patients’ difficulties in terms of early 
environmental deficits (failure of marked mirroring) with the analyst offering him/herself as a 
new object providing the kind of corrective emotional experience for which Alexander and 
French [, 1946 #2926] received considerable (if undeserved) psychoanalytic approbation.  
From this perspective the truth not properly attended to would be the unconscious 
conflicts that constitute the patient’s psychic reality. The emphasis upon the (corrective) 
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emotional experience of the treatment as the essence of psychotherapy brings the emotional 
aspects of the treatment into the foreground, denies the centrality of insight and at least 
historically tended to incur the strong disapproval of the analytic community. ‘Corrective 
emotional experience undeservedly became a synonym for superficial psychotherapy’ (Wolf, 
1992 p. 122).   
Fortunately, the overvaluation of insight is behind us and the recognition of the 
importance of emotional truth (the felt truth of an experience) seems generally recognised as 
the key to therapeutic progress. The increasing influence of infant research may have been a 
key driver of this shift (Fonagy, 1998b). The slogan of the Boston Change Process Study 
group that something more interpretation is needed where that something takes the form of 
psychological acts of a mutative relationship with the therapist, embodies the intersubjective 
experience of truth around which a substantial consensus has now emerged (Boston Change 
Process Study Group, 2002, 2010). The BCPSG (2010) conclusively address this issue when 
speaking of ‘now moments’ as affectively charged ‘moments of truth’ called kairos in ancient 
Greek—‘the moment that must be seized if one is going to change his destiny, and if it is not 
seized, one's destiny will be changed anyway for not having seized it’ (p. 42). What the 
BCPSG model fails to offer, compelling and unifying although it undoubtedly is, is a model 
of the psychological processes which may underpin the phenomenal experience of ‘moments 
of meeting’. This intersubjective experience of bi-personal truth ‘… produces a feeling of 
vitalization, or increased well-being, because there is increased coherence of the dyadic 
system as a whole’ (p. 89).  and 'an upshot of fitting together is vitalization, experienced by 
both partners, which in turn leads to a greater feeling of liking each other. This vitalization 
serves as a directional element, in that it encourages the two to repeat ways of being together 
that generate such inner experiences, thus being a hallmark of dyadic quality’ (p. 210).  
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Predictably there has been scholarly opposition from ‘vested interests’ to such a 
comprehensive redesign of the analytic process (e.g. Ellman & Moskowitz, 2008; Ryle, 
2003). The doubt emerges not principally from uncertainty about the emotional reality of 
such moments of truth but reservation about the limited emphasis given to language and 
cognition in bringing about the implicit relational knowing.  BCPSG’s emphasis is on 
relational knowing being automatically or implicitly updated in small ways with each 
encounter leading to an accumulation of small changes creating subtle shifts in organizations 
that ultimately influence behaviour outside the treatment situation. However, this appears to 
leave the bulk of the analytic process in the realm of the superfluous. Elsewhere, we have, in 
the spirit of BCPSG, also suggested that unconscious evocation of meaning encoded in vocal 
gestures through intonation, stress and other paralinguistic aspects of the encounter can carry 
interpersonal messages (Fonagy & Target, 2007b). But such suggestions of unconscious 
communication, while clearly important and undoubtedly intriguing, cannot be allowed 
conceptually to override the mainstream of verbal communication which provides the 
backbone of the therapeutic encounter.  While for the most part probably unintentionally, a 
focus on the implicit can raise it hierarchically above the explicit in importance, somehow 
closer to the ‘truth’ for which there is no genuine indication and the accompanying 
theorisation is imprecise at best. 
Mentalizing and the feeling of truth 
From its inception psychoanalysis set out to show the patient something about himself 
that he had not previously (consciously) known: to make the unconscious conscious.  The 
purpose of this, it should be noted, was not the acquisition of intellectual insight but had the 
pragmatic goal of bringing about change: enabling the patient to live differently, freeing him 
or her to love and work or, less ambitiously, exchanging neurotic misery for common 
unhappiness (Freud, 1893).  As Freud rapidly discovered, powerful forces within the patient 
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militate against acquiring such knowledge.  The analyst must find a way of helping the 
patient to hear the interpretations s/he offers: if s/he intervenes without regard for the 
patient’s defences, the interpretation, however accurate, is likely to fall on deaf ears.   
Our theories of borderline psychopathology and treatment have focused around the 
capacity for mentalization (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002).  We have come to view 
mentalization, that is, the ability to interpret both our own and other people’s behaviour in 
terms of underlying thoughts, feelings and wishes, as a multidimensional capacity that is 
acquired in the context of attachment relationships and is less securely established in 
individuals who for a variety of reasons have had only limited opportunity to learn about their 
minds in their early relationships with their caregivers (Fonagy & Target, 1996; Target & 
Fonagy, 1996).  This has often been the case in individuals with adult diagnoses of borderline 
personality disorder (Fonagy & Target, 2000).   In situations of interpersonal stress, such as 
may occur for example in the context of attachment relationships, the capacity of these 
individuals to mentalize is impaired, allowing developmentally earlier modes of thinking to 
(re)emerge.  This poses a problem for the therapist, since the vicissitudes of the relationship 
established with the patient are highly likely to make it difficult for the patient to keep 
mentalizing online (Fonagy & Target, 2007a).  Once this happens, no matter how true or 
accurate the interpretations the therapist might wish to offer are, the patient will not be able to 
make use of them because they are not experienced as true and are regarded with suspicion 
(Fonagy & Allison, 2014a).   
The solution we have advocated is a technique that strives to scaffold and facilitate 
the development of the patient’s capacity to mentalize by focusing therapeutic attention on 
validating, clarifying, sometimes challenging and elaborating on the mental state perspectives 
adopted by the patient (Bateman & Fonagy, 2010).  The patient’s experience of the therapist 
is a crucial focus of the work.  Notwithstanding the impression we may have given in our 
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earlier work, this is not undertaken principally in order to enable the patient to understand 
himself better, although this may be an outcome, nor to help him understand his relationship 
with the therapist better, although this almost inevitably happens as part of the process.  
Rather, the aim is to equip the patient with the tools to negotiate his current and future 
relationships more successfully.  We have come to think of mentalizing as a key to 
understanding resilience (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Higgitt, & Target, 1994), and we now also 
prefer to conceptualise the characteristic difficulties with mentalizing shown by patients with 
borderline personality disorder not as a deficit but as a useful adaptation (Fonagy, Luyten, & 
Allison, 2015a).  While in this context it may appear that we have reverted to a relativist 
view, where regaining the capacity to mentalize alone matters and the way that this is 
achieved is no longer the point, in the phenomenal experience of our patients, mentalizing is 
linked to an experience of ‘truth’, of the kind of sense of presence, vitality and at oneness 
with oneself and the social world which the BCPSG have also so eloquently described.  
In other words, we see mentalizing as marked by an intersubjective experience where 
two individuals feel the psychological presence of the other and the relationship between 
them feels real (not pretend or absent) and in that sense genuine and true. We all know the 
feeling of discourse with patients that is lacking this quality of vitality, when the impact of 
one’s words fail to resonate with the patients and when we struggle to achieve genuine 
understanding of the his/her apparently earnest discourse. In such communication there is no 
genuine mentalizing. When this starts, metaphorically speaking, the patient suddenly appears 
in the room. We are talking to them and our words clearly make an impact. Call this a 
moment of meeting if you like but such ‘moments’ can stretch into minutes and perhaps 
entire sessions (although this in our experience is rare – about five minutes is the modal 
length of mentalizing discourse). The risk is the illusion we are well able to create for 
ourselves that our mentalizing the patient is sufficient. Yet at our most ‘mentalizing’ we 
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create an illusion, a pretence of mentalizing which is so self-satisfying because it is 
compensating for the absence of mentalizing of our social (conversational) partner – our 
patient. We pseudo-mentalize (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009) or hypermentalize (Sharp et al., 
2011), create complex an unrealistic pictures of internal worlds, precisely because the person 
we are talking to has given up trying to find a genuine mental connection. In our experience 
this is a genuine clinical risk and the root cause of many a long analysis. In brief, using 
mental state language is not tantamount to mentalizing or truth. The connection (or borrowing 
Tronick’s phrase, co-consciousness) via genuine mutual sharing of mental state 
understanding generates the felt experience of  truth (Fonagy, 2015b; Tronick, 2007). 
Personal truth and epistemic trust 
The experience of mutual sharing leading to the experience of truth or sense of 
realness may have a profoundly important biological underpinning which we will now turn to 
explore. A straightforward link between truth and trust in the reliability of knowledge could 
be via the biologically overdetermined mechanism of attachment relationship. As described 
above, the sense of mutual understanding underpinned by mentalizing, we have suggested, is 
born of the dyadic connection between caregiver and child. The capacity to envision mental 
states in others grows out of a process of self-understanding which in turn depends on the 
other’s capacity to perceive the self as thinking and feeling (Sharp & Fonagy, 2008).  A 
secure caregiver-child relationship would be expected to facilitate this virtuous cycle, 
particularly as the security of the relationship is enhanced by the caregiver’s capacity to 
mentalize the child (Berthelot et al., 2015; Ensink, Berthelot, Bernazzani, Normandin, & 
Fonagy, 2014; Fonagy & Target, 2005). Thus, to the extent that truth and mentalizing are 
linked in the experience of mutual understanding, secure attachment could almost be seen as 
coterminous with the experience of truth or at least as a key route towards this experience.  
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Recently we have begun to view our earlier formulations of the mentalizing model of 
BPD as primarily mediated by attachment history as perhaps overly narrow, and attachment 
as a construct as perhaps somewhat limited from a developmental psychopathology 
standpoint (Fonagy & Campbell, in press). Previously, along with others (Gunderson, 1996), 
we placed considerable weight on role of attachment disorganization in our accounts of the 
disorder (Fonagy, Target, & Gergely, 2000).  We would here like to suggest that a broader 
perspective is necessary which places the notion of truth experience and mentalizing in a 
broader biological context of social communication that guides the infant to prioritize 
developing particular capacities and behaviours in order to maximise their chances of 
survival.  This line of thinking, grounded in Gergely and Csibra’s theory of natural pedagogy 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2006, 2009, 2011; Hernik & Gergely, 2015; Kiraly, Csibra, & Gergely, 
2013), takes as its starting psoint the relative helplessness and dependence of the human 
infant born into a cultural world of bewildering complexity where acquiring information from 
knowledgeable adults is crucial for continued existence.  In this situation, in order to survive, 
the human infant must learn fast, and he relies on his caregivers to facilitate this process.   
A new form of human natural selection (arguably dating back to the late Pleistocene) 
is based on  socially mediated learning and the transmission of cultural knowledge is 
introduced which contrasts with Darwinian evolution based on genetic  transmission passed 
on from one generation to the next (Wilson & Wilson, 2007). Co-evolution of gene and 
learning-based forms of natural selection applies to human cultures as well as individuals.  
The selective transmission of knowledge  primarily adaptive at the group level will enable 
human cultural diversity to be studied in the same way as biological diversity (Wilson, 2013), 
making the process of the interpersonal transfer of information via communication from one 
generation to the next perhaps the key biological function of development.   
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There are two possible bases on which a learner can accept cultural knowledge as 
true: they can either work it out for themselves (which is time-consuming and difficult, often 
impossible) or trust in the communicator’s authority (Wilson & Sperber, 2012)(Sperber et al., 
2010).  Trusting the communicator means that the learner does not have to go back to first 
principles each time they encounter novelty: a strange-looking tool without a self-evident 
purpose is accepted as being used as described by the trusted elder (Recanati, 1997).  Faith in 
such information is critical. The potential for being misled by false (untrue) information by 
unreliable, uninformed, or downright malevolent providers of useless or deceiving 
information is omnipresent for the young human. We will refer to the trust required for social 
learning as epistemic trust.  The capacity to teach and learn social knowledge underpins the 
evolution of human culture (Wilson, 1976).   
Trust involves exposing oneself to the risk of being misled, perhaps dangerously.  It is 
adaptive for humans to adopt a position of epistemic vigilance unless they are reassured 
otherwise (Recanati, 1997; Sperber et al., 2010). Children are not promiscuously credulous to 
those around them; there is evidence that dubious social signifiers and poor past performance 
may render a social communicator suspect, leading their assertions about the world to be 
regarded sceptically (Brousseau-Liard, Cassels, & Birch, 2014; Durkin & Shafto, 2016; 
Koenig & Harris, 2005). What is it that enables the infant to determine who is worthy of trust, 
which is necessary for their vigilance to be relaxed enough to allow them to encode the social 
knowledge they are being offered as significant, relevant to them personally and socially 
generalizable?  
The key signals that allow this kind of learning to take place are the communicator’s 
ostensive cues (Csibra & Gergely, 2009) (an inspired suggestion based on Bertrand Russell, 
1940): signals used by an agent to alert the addressee that the agent intends to communicate 
relevant pieces of cultural knowledge.  Ostensive cues for infants include eye contact, turn-
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taking contingent reactivity, and the use of a special vocal tone (‘motherese’), all of which 
appear to trigger a special mode of learning in the infant. Ostensive communicative cues, 
such as being called by name, trigger the pedagogic stance (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). By 
using ostensive cues—both in childhood and in adulthood—the communicator explicitly 
recognizes the listener as a person with intentionality. When the infant is paid special 
attention to and noticed as an agent, he/she adopts an attitude of epistemic trust and is thus 
ready to receive personally relevant knowledge about the social world that goes beyond the 
situationally specific experience. In this way knowledge is acquired that is relevant in many 
settings. The subjective experience of relevance and a judgement of truth thus crucially 
depends on having been made to feel agentive by the communicator. We can conceptualise 
the ‘moments of meeting’ emphasized by the BPCSG  as an experience of agency in the 
listener associated with a sense of feeling recognized which then opens a biologically 
prepared pathway to receive and internalize information to be incorporated into existing 
structures and to be used (without reference to the communicator) as true information.  
The link to mentalization is of course via the creation of a sense of agency (linking 
further to Max Weber’s notions of socialisation Giddens, 2013). The experience of truthful 
communication then, to some measure at least, depends on the interpersonal context where 
the communicator is able to demonstrate awareness of the recipient’s intentionality, which in 
turn generates trust and an expectation of truthfulness and personal relevance.  This then 
ensures the incorporation of new information into existing knowledge structures. Mentalizing 
the recipient thus serves as an ostensive cue. If my perspective is recognized by the 
communicator then there must be truth in what I have heard.  It is not that I do not understand 
what I am told without the ostensive cue but I would not consider the information relevant to 
me. I remember it, I can even repeat it, but I do not genuinely believe it. I do not consider it 
personally true. I could establish its truth value via working it out from first principles. But, 
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as we have said, that is quite hard work. What makes a teacher effective? It is being able to 
see and respond to the learning challenge from the student’s perspective (Hattie, 2013). 
Resisting truth and epistemic hypervigilance 
In normal circumstances, epistemic trust develops in the context of attachment 
relationships. Secure attachment relationships in infancy provide the most consistent 
contingent parental responses to the child, thus also the most consistent ostensive cueing, 
creating fertile ground for epistemic trust to emerge.  In situations where the young learner’s 
early environment is heavily populated by unreliable communicators, the opening of 
epistemic trust becomes problematic.  It may be more adaptive to remain persistently vigilant 
about, or even closed off to, the communication of social knowledge. In the face of an 
abusive and hostile caregiver, whose intentions towards the infant or child are not benign, 
epistemic mistrust may be a more appropriate adaptation. 
Epistemic hypervigilance can manifest as the over-interpretation of motives, which 
can take the form of hypermentalizing (Sharp et al., 2013; Sharp et al., 2011), or 
pseudomentalizing (Asen & Fonagy, 2012). In this state of mind, the recipient of 
communication assumes that the communicator’s intentions are other than those declared and 
therefore not treated as though from a deferential source. The truth of the message is resisted. 
Most typically, epistemic mistrust manifests as the misattribution of intention and the 
assumption of malevolent motives behind another person’s actions, and therefore treating 
them with epistemic hypervigilance (or conversely, in some instances, excessive 
inappropriate epistemic trust). There is some evidence to suggest that a hypermentalizing 
stance is more characteristic of BPD in adolescence (Sharp et al., 2013)(Sharp et al., 2011). It 
is possible that this hypermentalizing typically subsides into a flatter profile of outright 
epistemic mistrust as the individual matures. This pattern, we speculate, may partially 
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account for the common life course history of BPD symptoms which sees a reduction in 
impulsive symptoms over time, but no lessening of the affective and social symptoms 
associated with BPD.  
In a state of epistemic mistrust, the recipient of social communication may well 
understand what is being expressed to him/her, but he/she cannot encode it as truthful, as 
relevant to her/his experience, to internalize it and appropriately reapply it. Even when 
evidence is available to suggest that the person’s expectations may be ill founded, that 
important figures are loving and caring rather than hostile and malevolent, the evidence will 
be rejected as false and mistrust will continue to dominate. There is considerable stability 
associated with this mind state; the persistence is embedded in the resistance to potential 
alternative perspectives, to possible truths.  A person in a state of epistemic mistrust has a 
compromised capacity for appropriately interpreting social actions in terms of mental states 
which normally bolsters a sense of resilience, leaving the individual with dysfunctional social 
learning systems inadequate to assure adaptation in the face of change or ‘normal’ adversity. 
They see betrayal everywhere. Almost all communication may be contaminated by a sense of 
falseness and hypocrisy. The pervasive sense of expected inauthenticity creates a resistance 
to communication, the inbuilt natural system of epistemic vigilance becomes hyperactive; in 
a strange analogy with the immune system which attacks and rejects transplanted organs it 
identifies as foreign to the system, normal epistemic vigilance becomes overactive and labels 
all new information as inauthentic. This creates the epistemic petrification typical of 
persistent conditions (Fonagy, Luyten, & Allison, 2015b). The regular process of modifying 
one’s stable beliefs about the world in response to social communication has been closed 
down or disrupted.  
This generates the quality of rigidity and creates an impression of being ‘hard to 
reach’ that therapists have often described in their work in the field of PD (Fonagy et al., 
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2015a). Change cannot be made because although the patient can hear and understand the 
social communication transmitted by the therapist, this new information cannot be accepted 
as true for them (i.e. relevant to them) and therefore potentially helpful in other social 
contexts. The persistent distress and social dysfunction associated with PDs is the result of 
the destruction of the truthfulness of social knowledge of most kinds.  Personality disorder, 
therefore, may be best understood as a failure of communication arising from a breakdown in 
the capacity to forge learning relationships where knowledge about oneself and one’s 
relationships may be modified by new knowledge. It is, we believe, this quality that underlies 
the painful sense of isolation that characterizes the subjective experience of a patient with 
PD. 
Discovering social truths through forging epistemic trust 
Notwithstanding the ‘hard to reach’ quality of patients with PD referred to above, 
treatments have been shown to be effective as evidenced by clinical reports and formal RCTs 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 1999; Clarkin, Fonagy, & Gabbard, 2010; Clarkin, Levy, Lenzenweger, 
& Kernberg, 2007; Doering et al., 2010) (Gunderson & Links, 2014; Jørgensen et al., 2014; 
Jorgensen et al., 2013; McMain, Guimond, Streiner, Cardish, & Links, 2012; McMain et al., 
2009). But this is not an example of relativisms. Although many things appear to work, it is 
by no means the case that anything does. In fact in many of the trials it is treatment as usual 
(often by experts) which appears to fail relative to better-structured somewhat programmatic 
approaches where treatment manuals provide the therapists with clear directions as to what to 
say and when. How can we account for this?  Rather than invoking a content-free common 
factor – even one as appealing as mentalizing – we answer this question in terms of the 
structural features that these treatments share. Pertinently to the current context, our 
speculations link the comparable effectiveness of a diverse range of interventions to the felt 
truth experience of individuals treated in these therapies.  
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Elsewhere we have suggested that effective treatments of BPD all involve the 
sequential implementation of three communication systems relating to the concepts of 
epistemic trust and social learning (Fonagy & Allison, 2014b).  If psychopathology can be 
accounted for in terms of an underlying structure of epistemic mistrust in truth and personal 
relevance, this implies that the common aim of treatment must be to facilitate the emergence 
of epistemic trust and felt truth in order to allow social learning (or learning from experience) 
once again to take place.   
The initial step towards change involves communicating knowledge that indicates to 
the patient that the therapist may be a valuable source of information.  All evidence based 
models of therapy for persistent disorders present models of mind, disorder and change that 
are accurate, helpful to patients and increase capacity for understanding.  The therapist’s 
attempt to apply his model to the patient requires him to work collaboratively with the 
patient, to see the patient’s difficulties from the patient’s perspective, and to assume that s/he 
has things to teach the therapist.  In these ways the patient’s agency is recognised, and 
knowledge that is felt as relevant serves as an ostensive cue that allows patients to move 
towards reducing their epistemic hypervigilance. The therapeutic model provides 
explanations that feel relevant to the patient and generate moments of meeting or moments of 
truth. We do not see these moments as relevant for the insight they provide but the felt truth 
they generate serves to move the patient closer to the therapist and deepens the patient’s 
interest in the therapist’s thoughts and perhaps even feelings. 
This moves the treatment to a second step within the change process: the increase in 
mutual understanding (i.e. increasing the robustness of mentalizing in the patient). The 
therapist’s focus on the patient, their theory-driven attempt to understand their actions, 
invariably involves mentalizing. By mentalizing the patient effectively, the therapist models 
mentalization, creates an open and trustworthy environment, lowers emotional arousal and 
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makes it possible for the patient to exercise their growing curiosity about the therapist’s 
thoughts about them. A process of communication is rekindled characterized by the 
increasing frequency with which their communication is accompanied by the experience of 
felt truth. In this process the therapist recognises the patient as an agent, acknowledges and 
helps the patient to identify his/her emotional states (a form of marking), and makes 
extensive use of ostensive cues to indicate the personal relevance and generalizability of what 
is being communicated.  As the therapist models mentalization the patient’s inhibition or 
habitual disuse of this capacity is shifted and mentalizing is starts to be available to support 
the patient’s learning from social experience.  
Mentalizing in this context is not an end in itself. Mentalizing is the catalyst that 
activates the effective ingredient of therapy: learning from experience. Mentalizing 
moderates the impact of communication because ostensive cues of the therapist and others 
are frequently erroneously interpreted by a poorly mentalizing individual and epistemic trust 
is not established. With improved mentalizing the communication of the therapist is better 
appreciated and accurately interpreted as to be trusted and has the intended influence on the 
patient, who can begin to put it into practice, at first within and then beyond the therapeutic 
context.   The mentalizing stance recommended in mentalization based treatment (MBT) 
optimises the opportunity to regenerate epistemic trust through nonjudgmental 
inquisitiveness, curiosity, open-mindedness, uncertainty, not-knowing, and interest in 
understanding better (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008). What mentalizing brings to clinical 
impact is not linked to improved access to the truth of understanding the inner world. 
Mentalizing is helpful because it generates enriched appreciation of ostensive cuing, which in 
turn generates greater access to accurate and true social knowledge, allowing the patient to 
internalize new knowledge and modify social appraisal, expectations and behaviour 
accordingly.    
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The greatest benefit from a therapeutic experience comes from generalizing epistemic 
trust beyond therapy such that the patient can continue to learn and grow from the relatively 
undistorted truth encountered in relationships external to the therapeutic. Social learning in 
the context of epistemic trust occurs once again in the ‘real world’.  The person’s mind is 
opened to the truths they previously resisted via the establishment of epistemic trust 
(collaboration) that enables him/her once again to trust the social world. Thus, it is not just 
what is taught in therapy that teaches, but the evolutionary capacity for learning from social 
situation that is rekindled. Enhanced mentalizing improves social relationships and enables 
the individual to recognize who is a reliable and trustworthy source of information, who 
one’s true friends are; learning who I can be ‘friends with’ is key.  
The improved epistemic trust and abandonment of rigidity enables the person to begin 
to learn from experience once again. So change is probably due to how a person comes to use 
their social environment, not the truth of what is specifically discovered in therapy. The 
benefits of therapy remain contingent on what is accessible to patients in their particular 
social world.  Therapy interventions are effective because they open the person to social 
learning experience which feeds back in a virtuous cycle. If the environment is at least partly 
benign therapy will ‘work’;  social support, chronicity, complexity and intensity are the best 
predictors of therapeutic success (Fonagy, 2015a). If the truth that the lifting of epistemic 
hypervigilance uncovers is unremitting hostility and the absence of benign influence, the 
recovery of epistemic trust through therapy will generate no lasting improvement and may 
even lead to deterioration.  
The social context of truth 
This third step - social learning in the context of epistemic trust – is the mechanism, 
according to our thinking, at work in the circular and self-perpetuating relationship between 
24 
 
PD and the social context. The conceptualization of the three steps in a communication 
system involves an acknowledgment of the inherent limitations of clinical interventions in 
cases where the patient is faced with a wider social environment which does not support 
mentalizing. The implication of this is that what happens within any therapeutic intervention 
cannot, on its own, be expected to be enough for any lasting significant improvement in the 
patient’s state to occur.   And indeed, certain circumstances make it maladaptive for the 
individual to develop epistemic trust – to lower their social defences  - in social environments 
characterized by high levels of aggression or violence which prioritizes an external, non-
reflective rapidly responding affective focus on others as opposed to the self. 
While the epistemic mistrust of an individual with a history of trauma and PD 
symptomatology may be an understandable defensive adaptation, the philosophical tendency 
to veer between a dogmatic conception of truth and unresolvable scepticism can perhaps be 
seen as manifestations of a principled refusal to adopt the pedagogic stance: to the 
philosopher, truth cannot be guaranteed if it is learned from others but the problem is then 
that it becomes very difficult to find a way of guaranteeing it at all.  For example, the 
sceptical philosopher David Hume rapidly found that in his attempts to study causation what 
he identified over and over again was the role played by custom and habit in determining us 
to adopt the beliefs that guide us as truths.  He described the quandary this placed him in as a 
‘philosophical melancholy and delirium’ and characterised his experience of dismay in terms 
of painful social isolation: 
I am first affrighted and confounded with that forlorn solitude, in which I am plac’d in 
my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who not being able 
to mingle and unite in society, has been expell’d all human commerce, and left utterly 
abandon’d and disconsolate.  (Hume, 1739) 
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Hume’s preferred remedy for this distress was twofold: to remind himself that as a 
true sceptic he ought to be diffident of his philosophical doubts (recognizing them as 
indicating something about his mental states rather than knowledge about the world), and to 
allow the experience of a social environment to have a therapeutic effect on him: 
I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and 
when after three or four hour’s amusement, I wou’d return to these speculations, they 
appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into 
them any further.  
We have seen that anxieties on the one hand about authoritarianism masquerading as 
truth and on the other about a worrying epistemological and by implication moral relativism 
are also characteristic of psychoanalytic discourse.  Those who have laid stress on the need to 
face the truth (about oneself, about one’s relationships, about reality) tend to frame this as a 
safeguard against collusion between analyst and patient.  Conversely, those who have argued 
that psychoanalysis does not aim ‘to discover something that was already there’ see those 
who privilege achievement of increased self-awareness as in danger of becoming 
proselytisers: only working with the small subgroup of potential patients who would like to 
become analysts themselves.  What these two positions have in common is discomfort with 
the idea that psychoanalysis might involve any form of deferential knowledge transmission.  
The spectre of suggestion continues to haunt psychoanalysis.  As many commentators have 
noted, the discipline’s focus on individual psychology has prevented analysts from thinking 
systematically about groups and social systems, despite Freud’s insistence that ‘[I]n the 
individual’s mental life someone else is invariably involved, as a model, as an object, as a 
helper, as an opponent, and so from the very first Individual Psychology is at the same time 
Social Psychology as well—in this extended but entirely justifiable sense of the words’. 
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It is worth stressing the point that while the theory of natural pedagogy emphasises 
the vital role played by transgenerational transmission of knowledge in the development of 
human culture; ostensive cues are necessary in order for the channel for knowledge 
transmission to open.  It is not the case that humans will uncritically accept whatever they are 
offered. When we are offered pieces of social information, we experience as true what we 
find relevant and useful.  In infancy, contingent, marked mirroring that involves recognition 
of the child’s subjectivity and agency is experienced as helpfully naming and organising the 
child’s constitutional self-states, facilitating the regulation of affect and disposing him or her 
to learn about social cognition (Gergely & Watson, 1996).  Learning about ourselves in the 
interaction with the caregiver prepares us and equips us with the tools we will need to acquire 
this complex body of social knowledge.  If we are not assisted in this way to take ownership 
of the knowledge we are offered we are unlikely to be able to hold on to it and make use of it 
in new situations.   
Similarly, in therapy, the experience of the therapist having the patient’s mind in mind 
and helping them to make better sense of what they do in terms of underlying thoughts and 
feelings is a vital preliminary step on the road to beginning to do things differently.   If what 
the therapist offers in this respect is not felt to be true, the channel for knowledge 
transmission will remain closed and the patient will be unable to learn from the experience of 
therapy.  Experienced or felt truth is relevant not as an end in itself but as an ostensive cue 
allowing the patient to begin to take ownership of and use the social knowledge they are 
being offered both within and beyond the consulting room.  The experience of attention to, 
understanding of and respect for the individual psyche is essential to prepare us for the 
complexities of interaction in the large social groups that are characteristic of humankind, and 
from this perspective individual psychology is indeed group psychology as well.  While the 
experience of knowing and having the truth about oneself known is not an end in itself, it is 
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critical in enabling us to establish epistemic trust and build the mentalizing capacity that will 
enable us to navigate the choppy waters of social interaction successfully.     
  
28 
 
References 
Allen, J., Fonagy, P., & Bateman, A. (2008). Mentalizing in clinical practice. Washington: American 
Psychiatric Press. 
Asen, E., & Fonagy, P. (2012). Mentalization-based Therapeutic Interventions for Families. Journal 
of Family Therapy, 34(4), 347-370. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6427.2011.00552.x 
Bateman, A., & Fonagy, P. (2010). Mentalization based treatment for borderline personality disorder. 
World Psychiatry, 9(1), 11-15.  
Bateman, A. W., & Fonagy, P. (1999). Psychotherapy for severe personality disorder. Article did not 
do justice to available research data. Bmj, 319(7211), 709-710.  
Bernardi, R. (2005). What After Pluralism? Ulysses Still on the Road. . Psychoanal. Inq., 25, 654-
666.  
Berthelot, N., Ensink, K., Bernazzani, O., Normandin, L., Luyten, P., & Fonagy, P. (2015). 
Intergenerational transmission of attachment in abused and neglected mothers: the role of 
trauma-specific reflective functioning. Infant Ment Health J, 36(2), 200-212. doi: 
10.1002/imhj.21499 
Bion, W. R. (1959). Attacks on linking. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 40, 308-315.  
Bion, W. R. (1962a). Learning from experience. London, UK: Heinemann. 
Bion, W. R. (1962b). A theory of thinking. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 43, 306-310.  
Blackburn, S. (2005). Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Penguin. 
Boston Change Process Study Group. (2002). Explicating the implicit: The local level and the 
microprocess of change in the analytic situation. . Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 83, 1051-1062.  
Boston Change Process Study Group. (2010). Change in Psychotherapy: A Unifying Paradigm. . New 
York: W.W. Norton. 
Brousseau-Liard, P., Cassels, T., & Birch, S. (2014). You seem certain but you were wrong before: 
Developmental change in preschoolers’ relative trust in accurate versus confident speakers. 
Plos One, 9(9). doi:    10.1371/journal.pone.0108308 
29 
 
Clarkin, J. F., Fonagy, P., & Gabbard, G. O. (Eds.). (2010). Psychodynamic psychotherapy for 
personality disorders. A clinical handbook. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Publishing. 
Clarkin, J. F., Levy, K. N., Lenzenweger, M. F., & Kernberg, O. F. (2007). Evaluating three 
treatments for borderline personality disorder: A multiwave study. [Comparative Study 
Randomized Controlled Trial Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't]. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 164(6), 922-928. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.164.6.922 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2006). Social learning and social cognition: The case for pedagogy. In M. 
H. Johnson & Y. M. Munakata (Eds.), Processes of chanage in brain and cognitive 
developement. Attention and Performance (Vol. XXI, pp. 249-274). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2009). Natural pedagogy. Trends Cogn Sci, 13(4), 148-153. doi: S1364-
6613(09)00047-3 [pii]10.1016/j.tics.2009.01.005 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2011). Natural pedagogy as evolutionary adaptation. Philos Trans R Soc 
Lond B Biol Sci, 366(1567), 1149-1157. doi: 366/1567/1149 [pii] 10.1098/rstb.2010.0319 
Doering, S., Horz, S., Rentrop, M., Fischer-Kern, M., Schuster, P., Benecke, C., . . . Buchheim, P. 
(2010). Transference-focused psychotherapy v. treatment by community psychotherapists for 
borderline personality disorder: randomised controlled trial. Br J Psychiatry, 196(5), 389-395. 
doi: 10.1192/bjp.bp.109.070177 
Durkin, K., & Shafto, P. (2016). Epistemic Trust and Education: Effects of Informant Reliability on 
Student Learning of Decimal Concepts. Child Dev, 87(1), 154-164. doi: 10.1111/cdev.12459 
Eagleton, T. (1996). The Illusions of Postmodernism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Ellman, S. J., & Moskowitz, M. (2008). A Study of the Boston Change Process Study Group. . 
Psychoanal. Dial.,, 18, 812-837.  
Ensink, K., Berthelot, N., Bernazzani, O., Normandin, L., & Fonagy, P. (2014). Another step closer to 
measuring the ghosts in the nursery: preliminary validation of the Trauma Reflective 
Functioning Scale. Front Psychol, 5, 1471. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01471 
30 
 
Fonagy, P. (1998a). An attachment theory approach to treatment of the difficult patient. [Review]. 
Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 62(2), 147-169.  
Fonagy, P. (1998b). Moments of change in psychoanalytic theory: Discussion of a new theory of 
psychic change. Infant Mental Health Journal, 19, 163-171.  
Fonagy, P. (1999). Memory and therapeutic action (guest editorial). International Journal of Psycho-
Analysis, 80, 215-223.  
Fonagy, P. (2003). Some complexities in the relationship of psychoanalytic theory to technique. 
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 72(1), 13-47.  
Fonagy, P. (2015a). The effectiveness of psychodynamic psychotherapies: An update. World 
Psychiatry, 14(2), 137-150. doi: 10.1002/wps.20235 
Fonagy, P. (2015b). Mutual regulation, mentalization and therapeutic action: A reflection on the 
contributions of Ed Tronick to developmental and psychotherapeutic thinking. . 
Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 35, 355-369. doi: 10.1080/07351690.2015.1022481 
Fonagy, P., & Allison, E. (2014a). The role of mentalizing and epistemic trust in the therapeutic 
relationship. Psychotherapy, 51(3), 372-380. doi: 10.1037/a0036505 
Fonagy, P., & Allison, E. (2014b). The role of mentalizing and epistemic trust in the therapeutic 
relationship. Psychotherapy (Chic). doi: 10.1037/a0036505 
Fonagy, P., & Campbell, C. (in press). Bad Blood: 15 Years On. Psychoanalitic Inquiry.  
Fonagy, P., Edgcumbe, R., Moran, G. S., Kennedy, H., & Target, M. (1993). The roles of mental 
representations and mental processes in therapeutic action. The Psychoanalytic Study of the 
Child, 48, 9-48.  
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E., & Target, M. (2002). Affect regulation, mentalization, and the 
development of the self. New York, NY: Other Press. 
Fonagy, P., & Luyten, P. (2009). A developmental, mentalization-based approach to the 
understanding and treatment of borderline personality disorder. [Review]. Development and 
Psychopathology, 21(4), 1355-1381. doi: 10.1017/S0954579409990198 
31 
 
Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., & Allison, E. (2015a). Epistemic petrification and the restoration of epistemic 
trust: A new conceptualization of borderline personality disorder and its psychosocial 
treatment. Journal of Personality Disorders, 29(5), 575-609. doi: 10.1521/pedi.2015.29.5.575 
Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., & Allison, E. (2015b). Epistemic Petrification and the Restoration of 
Epistemic Trust: A New Conceptualization of Borderline Personality Disorder and Its 
Psychosocial Treatment. J Pers Disord, 29(5), 575-609. doi: 10.1521/pedi.2015.29.5.575 
Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Moulton-Perkins, A., Lee, Y.-W., Warren, F., Howard, S., . . . Lowyck, B. (in 
press). Development and Validation of a Self-report Measure of Mentalizing: The Reflective 
Functioning Questionnaire. PloS One.  
Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Higgitt, A., & Target, M. (1994). The Emanuel Miller Memorial 
Lecture 1992. The theory and practice of resilience. [Review]. Journal of Child Psychology 
and Psychiatry, 35(2), 231-257.  
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (1996). Playing with reality: I. Theory of mind and the normal development 
of psychic reality. [Case Reports]. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 77(Pt 2), 217-
233.  
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (2000). Playing with reality: III. The persistence of dual psychic reality in 
borderline patients. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81(5), 853-874.  
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (2005). Bridging the transmission gap: An end to an important mystery of 
attachment research? [doi: 10.1080/14616730500269278]. Attachment and Human 
Development, 7(3), 333-343. doi: 10.1080/14616730500269278 
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (2007a). Playing with reality: IV. A theory of external reality rooted in 
intersubjectivity. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 88(Pt 4), 917-937.  
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (2007b). The rooting of the mind in the body: New links between 
attachment theory and psychoanalytic thought. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 55, 411-456.  
Fonagy, P., Target, M., & Gergely, G. (2000). Attachment and borderline personality disorder: a 
theory and some evidence. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 23, 103-122.  
Freud, S. (1893). The Psychotherapy of Hysteria, from Studies on Hysteria S.E. 2 (pp. 253-305). 
32 
 
Freud, S. (1909). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard 
edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 10, pp. 1-147). London: 
Hogarth Press, 1955. 
Gergely, G., & Watson, J. (1996). The social biofeedback model of parental affect-mirroring. 
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 77, 1181-1212.  
Giddens, A. (2013). Politics and sociology in the thought of Max Weber: John Wiley & Sons. 
Grünbaum, A. (1984). The foundations of psychoanalysis: A philosophical critique. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Grünbaum, A. (2008). Popper's fundamental misdiagnosis of the scientific defects of Freudian 
psychoanalysis and of their bearing on the theory of demarcation. . Psychoanalytic 
Psychology,, 25(4), 574-589. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0013540  
Gunderson, J., & Links, P. L. (2014). Handbook of good psychiatric management (GPM) for 
borderline patients. Washington DC: American Psychiatric Press. 
Gunderson, J. G. (1996). The borderline patient's intolerance of aloneness: insecure attachments and 
therapist availability. Am J Psychiatry, 153(6), 752-758. doi: 10.1176/ajp.153.6.752 
Hattie, J. (2013). Visible learning: A synthesis of over 800 meta-analyses relating to achievement: 
Routledge. 
Hernik, M., & Gergely, G. (2015). To what adaptive problems is human teaching a solution? Behav 
Brain Sci, 38, e42. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X14000788 
Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Jimenez, J. P. (2008). Theoretical plurality and pluralism in psychoanalytic practice. Int J Psychoanal, 
89(3), 579-599. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-8315.2008.00059.x 
Jørgensen, C. R., Bøye, R., Andersen, D., Døssing Blaabjerg, A. H., Freund, C., Jordet, H., & 
Kjølbye, M. (2014). Eighteen months post-treatment naturalistic follow-up study of 
mentalization-based therapy and supportive group treatment of borderline personality 
disorder: Clinical outcomes and functioning. Nordic Psychology,, 66(4), 254-273.  
Jorgensen, C. R., Freund, C., Boye, R., Jordet, H., Andersen, D., & Kjolbye, M. (2013). Outcome of 
mentalization-based and supportive psychotherapy in patients with borderline personality 
33 
 
disorder: a randomized trial. Acta Psychiatr Scand, 127(4), 305-317. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-
0447.2012.01923.x 
Kiraly, I., Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2013). Beyond rational imitation: learning arbitrary means 
actions from communicative demonstrations. J Exp Child Psychol, 116(2), 471-486. doi: 
10.1016/j.jecp.2012.12.003 
Koenig, M. A., & Harris, P. L. (2005). The role of social cognition in early trust. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 9(10), 457-459. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.08.006 
McMain, S. F., Guimond, T., Streiner, D. L., Cardish, R. J., & Links, P. S. (2012). Dialectical 
behavior therapy compared with general psychiatric management for borderline personality 
disorder: clinical outcomes and functioning over a 2-year follow-up. Am J Psychiatry, 169(6), 
650-661. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2012.11091416 
McMain, S. F., Links, P. S., Gnam, W. H., Guimond, T., Cardish, R. J., Korman, L., & Streiner, D. L. 
(2009). A randomized trial of dialectical behavior therapy versus general psychiatric 
management for borderline personality disorder. Am J Psychiatry, 166(12), 1365-1374.  
O'Shaughnessy, E. (1994). What is a Clinical Fact? International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 75, 939-
947.  
Recanati, F. (1997). Can we believe what we do not understand? Mind & Language, 12(1), 84-100. 
doi: 10.1111/1468-0017.00037 
Renik, O. (2005). Standards and Standardization. Fort Da, 11, 60-72.  
Russell, B. (1940). An inquiry into meaning and truth. London, UK: Allen & Unwin. 
Ryle, A. (2003). Something more than the 'something more than interpretation' is needed: a comment 
on the paper by the Process of Change Study Group. Int J Psychoanal, 84(Pt 1), 109-118.  
Sharp, C., & Fonagy, P. (2008). The parent’s capacity to treat the child as a psychological agent: 
Constructs, measures and implications for developmental psychopathology. Social 
Development, 17(3), 737-754. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9507.2007.00457.x 
Sharp, C., Ha, C., Carbone, C., Kim, S., Perry, K., Williams, L., & Fonagy, P. (2013). 
Hypermentalizing in adolescent inpatients: Treatment effects and association with borderline 
traits. Journal of Personality Disorders, 27(1), 3-18. doi: 10.1521/pedi.2013.27.1.3 
34 
 
Sharp, C., Pane, H., Ha, C., Venta, A., Patel, A. B., Sturek, J., & Fonagy, P. (2011). Theory of mind 
and emotion regulation difficulties in adolescents with borderline traits. [Research Support, 
N.I.H., Extramural Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't]. Journal of the American Academy of 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 50(6), 563-573. doi: 10.1016/j.jaac.2011.01.017 
Sperber, D., Clement, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., & Wilson, D. (2010). 
Epistemic vigilance. Mind & Language, 25(4), 359-393. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
0017.2010.01394.x 
Target, M., & Fonagy, P. (1996). Playing with reality: II. The development of psychic reality from a 
theoretical perspective. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 77 (Pt 3), 459-479.  
Tronick, E. Z. (2007). The neurobehavioral and social-emotional development of infants and 
children. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Tuckett, D. (2003). Building a more secure base for psychoanalytic psychotherapy: conflicts in 
sharing the data. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 20, 177-189.  
Tuckett, D. (2005). Does anything go? Towards a framework for the more transparent assessment of 
psychoanalytic competence. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 86, 31-49.  
Wallerstein, R. (Ed.). (1992). The common ground of psychoanalysis. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. 
Wilson, D., & Sperber, D. (2012). Meaning and relevance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Wilson, D. S. (1976). Evolution on the level of communities. [Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-
P.H.S.]. Science, 192(4246), 1358-1360.  
Wilson, D. S. (2013). Human Cultures are Primarily Adaptive at the Group Level. Cliodynamics: The 
Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History, 4(1), 102–138.  
Wilson, D. S., & Wilson, E. O. (2007). Rethinking the theoretical foundation of sociobiology. . Q Rev 
Biol., 82(4), 327-348.  
Wolf, E. S. (1992). On being a scientist or a healer  Annual of Psychoanalysis, 20, 115-129.  
 
 
